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AN ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA’S LEGAL REGIME FOR 
IMPOSING LIABILITY ON MANUFACTURERS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS 
Following a trial in June 2009 where the Federal Court heard submissions regarding 
whether Merck Sharpe and Dohme Australia should be held liable for an increased risk of 
cardiovascular conditions noted in patients who had taken the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx, 
a judgment was handed down against MSDA in March 2010. MSDA appealed to the Full 
Federal Court, where they were successful. Special leave to appeal to the High Court of 
Australia was rejected in May 2012. This article will examine the themes raised in the trial 
judgment and the appropriateness of Australia’s statutory consumer protection regime 
through the lens of pharmaceutical drug injuries and side effects.  
On 11 May 2012, the High Court of Australia refused to grant leave for Mr Peterson to 
appeal against a judgement by the full bench of the Federal Court which found that Merck 
Sharpe and Dohme Australia (MSDA) was not liable for the heart attacks he suffered. The 
case rested on the allegation that consumption of Merck and Co Inc’s anti-inflammatory drug 
Vioxx was accompanied by the increased risk of suffering a heart attack. Mr Peterson had 
been prescribed Vioxx in May 2001 on the advice of his doctor and suffered a heart attack in 
December 2003. In September 2004, Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market 
worldwide, as evidence linking Vioxx to heart attacks increased. As MSDA was responsible 
for the marketing and selling of Vioxx in Australia and Merck was its parent company, they 
were named first and second respondents respectively.  
Trial judge Jessup J delivered a 300 plus page judgment in March 2010. Out of five grounds 
of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendants, only two were successful. This 
finding was overturned on appeal by the Full Federal Court on October 2011. Careful 
examination of both judgments reveals a flawed application of the statutory regime to claims 
involves drug injuries, as well as unsatisfactory resolution of associated issues. While the 
latter may stem from the pleadings, thus limiting the court’s ability to decide on the matters, 
the case overall highlights how unprepared the Australian statutory regime is in this area. 
Although Jessup J’s finding was overturned on appeal, it should be noted that the appeal was 
successful due to an incorrect finding of causation. In other areas of law, the Full Court either 
did not question or affirmed Jessup J’s application of the law. The trial judgment therefore 
continues to remain relevant and is especially significant to members of the class action 
Peterson had been representing.  
In addition to the anticipated Vioxx lawsuits arising out of the Peterson class action, 
thalidomide is also making a comeback. In the 2011 case Rowe v Grunethal GmbH and Ors 
[2011] VSC 657, a Victorian court ruled that Australia was an appropriate forum for a 
claimant, allegedly disabled due to her mother’s consumption of Thalidomide during 
pregnancy, to bring an action against German drug manufacturers. Although this matter has 
settled, it is part of a wider class action which may be subject to litigation, pending settlement 
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talks.
1
 With increasing scrutiny pertaining to the liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers for 
drug injuries, a review of the Australian statutory product liability regime is both appropriate 
and timely.  
This article will examine the main policy considerations the legislature had in mind when 
certain sections of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Australian Consumer Law 
were enacted, how the legislation operates and problems arising from the regime.  It aims to 
provide a basis for the discussion of future reform of Australia’s product liability regime.  
PHARMACEUTICALS AND THE LAW 
The Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration defines “medicine” as a therapeutic good 
used to achieve its “principal intended action by pharmacological, chemical, immunological 
or metabolic means in or on the body of a human.”2 A therapeutic good in turn is defined as 
“goods used for therapeutic use” or an ingredient or component in the manufacture of 
therapeutic goods.” 3  This article will adopt this definition, but use the more commonly 
known terms “pharmaceutical” or “drug”. 
Pharmaceuticals pose a significant and nuanced challenge to product liability laws in 
general.
4
 At every stage of a drug’s life from development, trial, release onto market as well 
as during post-marketing there is an element of unpredictability and uncertainty. Controlled 
trials are contrived, in the sense that they may not accurately reflect the actual population and 
circumstances of patients likely to take the drug and the need to constantly monitor usage by 
way of post-market surveillance.
5
 In the majority of cases there is a health professional – 
usually a doctor or a pharmacist – who acts as the “learned intermediary” when deciding 
whether a drug should be taken and then gives a prescription complete with a particular 
dosage.
6
 Underpinning this process is a government regulatory agency – in Australia it is the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration which oversees the drafting and enforcement of standards 
and guidelines to control the release or recall of drugs. Finally, even after approval and 
release of the drug into the market, it is still regarded as part of the clinical trial process 
                                                          
1
 Associated Press, Australian Woman Reaches Settlement With UK-based Thalidomide Distributor (The 
Guardian) http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/18/australian-woman-settlement-thalidomide-distributor  
viewed 15 January 2003.  
2
 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), s 3.  
3
 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), s 3. 
4
 This summary about drug development obtained from Ng R, Drugs – From Discovery to Approval (Wiley-
Liss, United States of America, 2004). 
5
 Teff H, “Products Liability” in Kennedy I, Grubb A, Laing J and McHale J (ed) Principles of Medical Law (3rd 
ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) p 984. 
6
 This was indirectly referred to in Peterson trial case when Jessup J examined the part played by the doctor in 
prescribing the plaintiff Vioxx. The legislature also alludes to this: Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices 
Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth) recognises that goods are not necessarily 
directly supplied to or acquired by the person who suffers the loss or damage. 
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(Phase IV) and thus uncertainty continues, as it is observed in an uncontrolled, real-world 
environment.
7
  
Yet the social utility of pharmaceuticals, as a mechanism for combating and preventing 
disease and for easing pain, mitigates against a regulatory system that is overly proscriptive. 
There is also another important factor: the need to ensure patient access to life-saving drugs 
in a timely manner. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration is commonly 
attacked on two fronts by two interest groups: industry who argues that the agency delays 
access due to lengthy approval processes, versus public interest groups who argue the agency 
is not sufficiently thorough in reviewing new drugs.
8
 All these considerations are significant 
confounding factors in any utilitarian assessment of the efficacy of the current regulatory 
regime, and as a result, there is always the political risk of public criticism or legal challenge, 
especially as the “consequences of each possible regulatory action – approval, delay, or non-
approval are only fully realised in retrospect
.”9
  
AUSTRALIAN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS 
In Australia, the legislature has made no specific provision to analyse the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the regime in the context of drug injury claims. This is not due to ignorance – as 
will be seen later, an examination of parliamentary instruments indicate that lawmakers were 
aware of pharmaceutical industry concerns during law reform processes.  
For over 30 years until 1 January 2011, the regime for governing consumer protection and 
product liability was the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and its state equivalencies. On 1 
January 2011, when the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) came into full effect, 
schedule 2 of that Act, the Australian Consumer Law superseded and replaced the TPA, but 
much of the jurisprudence associated with the TPA continues to be at least persuasive to the 
ACL. This article will trace the history of the two regimes with respect to the implied 
warranties/statutory guarantees of fitness for purpose, merchantable/acceptable quality and 
liability for defective goods as well as other relevant sections.  
Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that when interpreting the 
provision of a statute, an interpretation that would “best achieve the purpose or object” of that 
Act is to be preferred. This attitude is reinforced by the courts (for example, Henjo 
Investments v Collins Marrickville (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546) which have expressly 
recognised that consumer law provisions are influenced by public policy considerations. A 
                                                          
7
 Medicines Australia, Clinical Trials, http://medicinesaustralia.com.au/issues-information/clinical-trials/  
viewed 15 January 2011.  
8
 Daemmrich A and Krucken G, “Risk versus risk: decision-making dilemma of drug regulation in the United 
States and Germany” (2000) 9 Science as Culture 505; O’Donnell J, “Liability, Litigation and Lessons in Drug 
Development” in Smith C and O’Donnell J, The Process of New Drug Discovery and Development (2nd ed, CRC 
Press, New York, 2006) p 503. 
9
 O’Donnell, n 8, p 507. 
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review of the reform reports, submissions from industry groups and legislative instruments
10
 
give both valuable insights into the objectives that lawmakers and reformers had in mind 
when they were looking into product liability law reform as well as concerns articulated by 
various stakeholders.  
The relevant sections:  
Specifically, three sections will be looked at – that the good is of an acceptable quality, that it 
is fit for purpose and liability for a safety defect which caused injury.  
Fit for purpose of merchantable/acceptable quality:  
Section 74B/section 55 provides that where a supplier supplies goods to a consumer, there is 
an implied warranty/statutory guarantee as to the good’s reasonable fitness for any subjective 
or particular purpose as is disclosed by the consumer to the supplier.  
Section 74D/s55 provide an implied warranty/statutory guarantee that a good supplied is of 
merchantable/acceptable quality. While “fit for purpose for which that good is commonly 
bought” is included in the definition of “merchantable” and “acceptable” quality, s74D(2) 
defines this as taking into account the description and price of the good as well as all other 
relevant circumstances. On the other hand, the current statutory guarantee in s55(2)(c) and (d) 
define “acceptable quality” as also being “free from defects and safe.” S55(3) adds matters 
for determining fitness such as nature; price; statements, packaging or labelling; 
representation of the goods by the supplier or manufacturer and other relevant circumstances. 
Liability for a safety defect:  
Part VA/Part 3-5 imposes liability upon manufacturers where the goods in question have a 
“safety defect” which causes injury, loss or damage – s75AD/s138. The meanings of “safety 
defect” are identical in the relevant sections (s75AC/s9) which provide the test as to where 
the safety of such products “is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect.” Regard is 
to be given to other relevant matters such as the manner of marketing, packaging, 
instructions, reasonable expectations of their use or function and the time of supply.
11
 
Unlike the implied warranties/statutory guarantees, manufacturers have available to them a 
number of defences which are based on their reasonable conduct. A notable defence is the 
development risk defence as set out in s75AK(1)(c)/s142(c). The defence is successful if it is 
established that “the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time [the product] was 
supplied by their actual manufacturer was not such as to enable that safety defect to be 
discovered.”  
                                                          
10
 Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Swanson Report (1976); Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC), Product Liability Report No 51 (1989); Industry Commission Report, Product Liability (1990); 
Goldring J, “Reforming Product Liability Laws” (1989) Bond Law Review 193; Explanatory Memorandum, 
Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 June 1992, 
3372 (Michael Tate); Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Product Liability – Where Should the Loss Fall? (1992). 
11
 S75AC(2)/s9(2).  
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The Trade Practices Act:  
Australian lawmakers placed emphasis on consumer protection by holding businesses legally 
and financially accountable for their products but at the same time were keen to ensure 
business efficiency and product innovation, and that manufacturers were only accountable to 
the extent they were in control of the goods. Flexibility in laws was introduced in the form of 
s52, the general prohibition of “misleading and deceptive conduct”, enacted to ensure that the 
law would not be “continually one step behind businessmen who resort to smart practices.”12 
A plaintiff cannot claim damages for personal injury or death under the ACL equivalent s18 
as s137C of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 prohibits this.  
Section 53 is more specific, providing that a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in 
connection with the supply of goods, or the promotion by any means of the supply or use of 
goods make certain false representations. Government was also given broad power to recall 
or ban unsafe goods,
13
 but only as a last option, for example where the manufacturer is unable 
or unwilling to voluntarily recall the goods.
14
 
The implied warranty provisions of Part V Div 2A arose out of the Swanson Report
15
 in 
1977. Reflecting the pro-consumer stance of the regime, the Report noted that “it is the 
manufacturer placing goods on to the market… who is largely responsible for the quality of 
goods”.16 They are also the party best placed to adjust the manufacturing process to correct 
future defects.
17
 As a result, manufacturers should have direct legal responsibility in ensuring 
the goods comply with statutory and quality standards.
18
 This reasoning overcame the barrier 
of privity (or lack of), allowing consumers to directly sue manufacturers and the TPA was 
amended accordingly. In addition, the strict liability nature of the implied warranties eased 
the evidentiary burdens upon plaintiffs, who otherwise faced “insurmountable difficulties of 
proof”19 during litigation,20 such as being unable to access information about the product 
which was in the defendant manufacturer’s hands. Finally, the implied warranties also 
ensured the regime had a deterrent effect. The imposition of fault on the responsible party 
would, theoretically, act to prevent or minimise the incidence of loss 
21
 as the party will adopt 
good practices and invest in safety measures as part of risk avoidance. Conversely, the party 
                                                          
12
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 July 1974 (The President). 
13
 Section 65F, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  
14
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 March 1986 (Mr Lionel Bowen).  
15
 Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Swanson Report (1976), 76. 
16
 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (CCAAC), Consumer Rights: reforming statutory 
implied conditions and warranties. Final Report (October 2009), 76. 
17
 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, n 16. 
18
 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council, n 16.  
19
 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ L 210 /29, 
7.  
20
 Thieffry P, Van Doorn P and Lowe S, “Strict product liability in the EEC: implementation, practice and 
impact on US manufacturers of Directive 85/374” (1989-1999) 25 Tort and Insurance LJ 65, 68.  
21
 Galitsky S, “Manufacturers’ Liability: An Examination of the Policy and Social Cost of a New Regime” 
(1979) 3 UNSWLJ 145, 147.  
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responsible for putting goods onto the market would usually profit from the good and thus be 
better placed to implement loss spreading measures. They would spread the risk, with the 
reasoning that the “activity of making the particular product should pay its own way.”22 
But in the 1980s, lawmakers recognized that holding manufacturers liable for goods they 
controlled also entailed limiting liability to the extent they controlled those goods. In the 
reform process which led to Part VA of the TPA on safety defects, the policy objective was to 
ensure that manufacturers were only liable to the extent the defect was their fault. The 
“consumer expectation test” of whether a good is defective was tempered by s75AC(2), 
which provides that a court must take into account a number of circumstances when 
determining the safety of a good. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Attorney-General 
also added that safety depends on “matters such as the nature and community knowledge of 
the product.”23 An example mentioned was pharmaceuticals, known to have unavoidable side 
effects but balanced against the “substantial benefits” to the wider community, a chance of 
injury could not of itself mean they are “defective.”24 
Lawmakers also acknowledged that the supply of certain goods may involve an 
intermediary.
25
 Pharmaceuticals were again cited as an example: it was expected that 
pharmaceutical companies would provide medical practitioners with the relevant product 
information rather than to the consumer due to the complex nature of the product. This would 
impact on whether a good, in particular its accompanying warnings or instructions,
26
 is 
defective, as a manufacturer could not be faulted for a defective warning if they had informed 
the medical practitioner, who in turn failed to inform the consumer of the risk.
27
 
One of the defences which had been considered was the development risk defence. Three 
justifications were put forward to support the inclusion of this defence. Firstly, the 
manufacturer could only be held liable until “the existence of the defect was incapable of 
being ascertained by any means...or came into existence after the product left the 
manufacturer’s control.” 28  A second priority was the “technological and innovative 
development of industry.”29  Inhibiting product innovation and development would deprive 
the community of beneficial goods as well as put Australian goods at a disadvantage in the 
overseas market.
30
 In addition, from a pharmaceutical industry as well as patient well-being 
perspective, something was required to act as a medium between balancing the risks of a drug 
which had high therapeutic value (and therefore was associated with a high risk of injury) 
against risk of suffering and death of a patient if a drug was withheld from the market for too 
                                                          
22
 Wade J, “On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products” (1973) 44 Miss LJ 825, 826. 
23
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth), p 8.  
24
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 23.  
25
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 23.  
26
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 23, 9.  
27
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 23, 14.  
28
 ALRC, n 10, 50; Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 3 June 1992, 3372 (Michael Tate). 
29
 ALRC, n 10, 48 citing J Simpson; Industry Commission Report n 10. 
30
 ALRC, n 10, 48.  
7 
 
long.
31
 Finally, there was concern that unforeseeable losses or injuries could not be insured,
32
 
nor could costs be spread by the manufacturer in the pharmaceutical industry as costs of 
medicines were controlled.
33
 While there were submissions against the defence, the ALRC 
recommended the defence be included, citing the importance of fairness in allocating and 
shifting the risk of loss.
34
 Manufacturers would have a continuing obligation to inform and 
update themselves on advances in knowledge and incorporate them into future supplies.
35
 
The Australian Consumer Law: 
After a series of studies
36
 leading up to the reform of the TPA into the ACL, on August 2008, 
a Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs agreed on a common, overarching objective to 
guide the reforms: “to improve consumer wellbeing through consumer empowerment and 
protection…enabling confident participation of consumers in markets in which both 
consumers and suppliers trade fairly.”37 
The Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 Explanatory 
Memorandum
38
 explained how policy influenced the amendments. In deciding whether and 
how to rewrite the TPA as the ACL, lawmakers considered the regulatory impact of three 
specific and significant amendments to the regime: the creation of a national consumer 
protection law,
39
 the aspects of a national product safety law
40
 and the consumer 
guarantees.
41
 These are the three Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS) included in the 
Explanatory Memorandum.  
A major driving force behind enacting a national consumer protection law was to ensure 
consistency and certainty for all parties involved. This had already been a concern for 
lawmakers during the TPA era as it was important as businesses wanted to know “in advance 
and precisely as possible what the law required them to do.”42 Indeed, lawmakers intended to 
retain most of the policies forming the basis of the TPA, but were driven by an additional 
                                                          
31
 ALRC, n 10, 48.  
32
 ALRC, n 10, 48.  
33
 ALRC, n 10, 48. 
34
 ALRC, n 10, 49-50.  
35
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth).  
36
 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (CCAAC), Consumer Rights: reforming statutory 
implied conditions and warranties. Final Report (October 2009); Productivity Commission Research Report, 
Review of the Australian Consumer Product Safety System (2006); Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, 
Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (2008); Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs Meeting, 
Joint Communique (15 August 2008) Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/mcca/mcca_meetings/downloads/Meeting_20_15_Aug_08.pdf  viewed 
15 January 2013. 
37
 Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs Meeting, n 36. 
38
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth). 
39
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth), 
Chapter 23. 
40
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 38, Chapter 24.  
41
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 38, Chapter 25.   
42
 Goldring, n 10 208.  
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motivating factor: merging the TPA and existing state acts to form one harmonious national 
consumer protection law, bringing benefits for all parties.  
For consumers, consistency in consumer protection law would result in clarity, understanding 
and greater confidence in trading,
43
 as well as easier access to legal redress due to removal of 
jurisdictional barriers.
44
 Businesses would only need to comply with one national law
45
 and 
(theoretically) benefit from the consistency in the form of reduced complexity and 
compliance costs
46
 and then pass those savings onto their consumers. National consistency 
would also encourage new businesses to be formed,
47
 and current businesses would benefit 
from the law’s efficiency. 48  A national law also meant benefits for governments, as 
jurisdictions could share and allocate costs
49
 and duplication of laws state by state could be 
avoided.
50
 
While for most of the relevant sections, the jurisprudence associated with their TPA 
predecessors continues to apply, significant amendments were made. Federal lawmakers 
wanted to ensure that best practice protocols from state laws which served the state citizens 
well would continue to operate. Section 53 of the TPA became s29 of the ACL and was 
amended to include a prohibition of false and misleading testimonials.
51
 Although businesses 
would be additionally burdened by this amendment, the burden was minimal as they only had 
to prove the testimonial was genuine,
52
 evidence of which would be simple to obtain.  
Lawmakers reaffirmed government had a proactive duty in the protection of consumers by 
identifying and removing unsafe products from the market through “recalls, bans, safety 
standards and public warnings.”53 However, protection of consumers could not be at the 
expense of business efficiency.
54
 The issue was what was the extent of the official power to 
ban or recall unsafe goods? While unsafe goods with obvious defects would certainly be 
subject to such power, lawmakers felt this power should extend to goods which did not have 
a defect per se but would be unsafe or cause injury during “reasonably foreseeable use”55 
even if such use was not the intended or normal use of the product. While such an 
amendment would burden suppliers who could not foresee every instance of misuse, 
reasonable foreseeability acted as a limitation and was a concept well understood by courts.
56
 
                                                          
43
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth), 
465. 
44
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43. 
45
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 464. 
46
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 465. 
47
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43.  
48
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43.  
49
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 466.  
50
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 465.  
51
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 555.  
52
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 559.  
53
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 568.  
54
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 569.  
55
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 577. 
56
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 578.  
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In addition, it was believed that the threat of a ban or recall would encourage better design 
and product information or warnings which would benefit consumers.
57
 
During the reform process, many of the submissions to lawmakers in regards to Part V, Div 
2A referred to the difficulty in comprehending the concept of “implied warranties”.58 Express 
statutory guarantees on the other hand were clearer in purpose and intent and the 
Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisor Council (CCAAC) recommended that in the new 
national law, implied warranties be so converted,
59
 but in substance retained the same rights 
and obligations under the TPA regime.
60
 This amendment in terminology was directly 
influenced by the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 which used express statutory 
guarantees. Ironically, when the New Zealand legislation was being drafted, lawmakers had 
considered – and rejected – these very same implied warranties, viewing them as too vague. 
New Zealand jurisprudence is applicable to the ACL.
61
 
In a similar vein, submissions were also received by the CCAAC which expressed 
dissatisfaction with “vague concepts such as merchantable quality”.62 “Acceptable quality” 
on the other hand was more comprehensible to consumers and businesses and more 
appropriate in the modern context of trade, as opposed to the ancient and archaic
63
 concept of 
merchantability.
64
  
AUSTRALIAN CASE LAW 
While only a few cases have been reported under the product liability sections they provide 
context as to how the court applies them. In Rasell v Cavalier Marketing (Australia) Pty Ltd 
(1991) 2 Qd R 323 it was held that in determining merchantable quality, the purpose of the 
good need only be a common purpose. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) vs Glendale (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Emmett J, 27 February 1998) 
caustic soda was found to be instructionally defective as it gave no warning about the dangers 
of mixing soda with hot water when it was reasonably foreseeable that a consumer would use 
the caustic soda in such a way, and in fact, Glendale had marketed the product for such a 
purpose.  
In Courtney v Medtel [2003] FCA 36 a pacemaker was found to be both unmerchantable and 
unfit for purpose due to being manufactured with a particular type of spool. Pacemakers 
manufactured with this spool were subject to a substantially greater or super-added risk of 
premature failure, which was not what doctors and their patients would reasonably expect of 
                                                          
57
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 578.  
58
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 596.  
59
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 617  
60
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 616.  
61
 Explanatory Memorandum, n 43, 179.  
62
 CCAAC, n 16, citing Mr Spier and Mr Stephens, 34. 
63
 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth), 
18 and 602.  
64
 CCAAC, n 16, 38.  
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a device of which the purpose was to restore and maintain a normal heartbeat. It was this 
increased risk which rendered the device neither of merchantable quality nor fit for purpose. 
Despite the applicant’s own pacemaker functioning perfectly, he was still entitled to 
compensation. One is apt to feel sympathetic toward the defendants and upon appeal (Medtel 
Pty Ltd Limited v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151), Moore J noted this paradox where the 
pacemaker served its purpose and would have continued to do so into the foreseeable future 
but was properly classified as not fit for purpose. Turnill describes it as “alarming.” 65 
However, the finding of liability is consistent with the strict liability nature of the implied 
warranties/statutory guarantees provisions and the Swanson Report findings. Indeed, as 
Sackville J wrote in Courtney:  
“It is not clear to me why the patient, rather than the manufacturer 
or distributor should bear any loss or damage fairly attributable to 
the use of materials in the manufacturing process that significantly 
increased the risk the goods would fail to achieve their purpose. As 
between the manufacturer and the distributor and the consumer, it 
was the former that had the capacity to prevent or eliminate the 
problem.”66 
In Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros [2004] FCA 853 while a chip on a mechanical heart valve was a 
manufacturing defect under the safety defect provisions, there was no finding of liability as 
the plaintiff could not establish it existed at the time it left the manufacturer’s control. As for 
s74B, Kiefel J denied the action as the risk of developing a clot was well-known to the 
community and presumably the claimant would have been imputed knowledge from her 
doctor and would have reasonably expected that complications would occur from use of the 
valve. 
These cases have all met with the policy objectives behind the various product liability 
sections, especially manufacturer control, consumer protection and acknowledging external 
circumstances which may limit the extent of manufacturers liability. There are then two cases 
which highlight concerns about the operation of the regime. 
In Ryan v Great Lakes Council [1999] FCA 177 and the appeal judgment Graham Barclay 
Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2000) 177 ALR 18 the court was faced with claims on the grounds of 
s74B/s55, s74D/s54 and Part VA/Part 3-5 over the consumption of contaminated oysters. In 
regards to the safety defect claim, the contamination was indeed a manufacturing defect, 
however as contamination could not have been discovered without the oysters being 
destroyed, the development risk defence was satisfied (s75AK(1)(c)/s142(c)). However, due 
to the contamination, the oysters were not fit for the purpose of consumption, nor of 
                                                          
65
 Turnill A, Liability for Manufacturers Who Supply Unmerchantable Goods (International Association of 
Defense Counsel) http://www.iadclaw.org/pdfs/DDD-March_8.pdf  viewed 15 January 2013. 
66
 Courtney v Medtel [2003] FCA 36, [234].  
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merchantable quality, in circumstances where it was reasonable for a consumer to expect the 
oysters to be free from contamination and fit for consumption.
67
  
10 years after Ryan, Peterson v Merck Sharpe and Dohme [2010] FCA 180 (Peterson) came 
before the Federal Court where Merck’s anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx came under scrutiny, 
due to its unforeseen side effects which research found increased the risk of heart attacks and 
strokes among consumers.  Out of five causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff, four were 
statutory. They were that Merck Sharpe Dohme Australia (MSDA) had engaged in 
misleading and deceptive conduct by excluding the association between Vioxx and heart 
attacks in its promotions and warning labels; that Vioxx was unfit for purpose; not of 
merchantable quality and suffered a safety defect. While Jessup J found the defendants were 
guilty of misleading and deceptive conduct, causation could not be established as the 
evidence supported a finding that the doctor would have prescribed Vioxx even if made 
aware of the associated risks of the drug. The majority of the case turned to the other three 
actions. In an almost scripted repeat of the Ryan saga, Jessup J found Vioxx to be defective, 
accepted evidence which established the development risk defence and then went on to find 
MSDA liable for damages on the grounds of fitness for purpose and being of unmerchantable 
quality. Although an appeal by MSDA was upheld and the High Court refused leave for an 
appeal to that, both Ryan and Peterson highlight concerns about whether TPA statutory 
regime and the extent to which it has been replicated in the ACL is meeting the relevant 
policy objectives.  
 
The Peterson judgments  
Out of five causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff in the TPA, four were statutory. They 
were that Vioxx was unfit for purpose; it was not of merchantable quality; that it had a safety 
defect; and that the defendant’s promotion of Vioxx which excluded the association between 
Vioxx and increased risk of heart attacks constituted misleading and deceptive conduct. 
Trial judgment: 
Peterson has summarised in other works
68
 and this article will only repeat excerpts of the 
judgment to discuss themes arising from it. In relation to the four statutory causes of action, 
the plaintiff was successful on the fitness for purpose and merchantable quality. Jessup J also 
found that that Vioxx had a safety defect; however the defendants were able to successfully 
defeat this claim with the state of the art defence.
69
 Jessup J also found that the defendants 
were guilty of misleading and deceptive conduct. However causation could not be established 
as the evidence tended towards a finding that the plaintiff’s doctor would have prescribed 
Vioxx even if made aware of the associated risks of the drug.  
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Federal court appeal: 
MSDA then appealed to the Full Federal Court. In October 2011, the Court handed down a 
unanimous judgment in Merck Sharp and Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] 
FCAFC 128 (Merck), where they allowed the appeal. The Court agreed with Jessup J on his 
conclusions regarding misleading and deceptive conduct as well as the defectiveness of 
Vioxx and the state of the art defence. However, the Court overturned the findings that Vioxx 
was unfit for purpose and of unmerchantable quality. 
An application for leave to appeal which focused only on the question of causation was 
rejected by the High Court in May 2012 (Peterson v Merck Sharp and Dohme Australia 2012 
HCATrans 105. 
Misleading and deceptive conduct:  
The claimant’s s52 action was based on misleading conduct, stemming from MSDA’s failure 
to warn or communicate the risk associated with Vioxx to medical practitioners, pharmacists 
or other health professionals: effectively, conduct by omission.
70
 Specifically, it was failure 
to state this in the product information, which practitioners would read and reasonably 
assume that they knew all the information which MSDA knew about the drug.
71
 This was not 
the case as MSDA was then aware of the trial results which indicated a link between the risk 
of heart attack and Vioxx and the product information did not reflect this association and did 
not do so until November 2001.
72
 The claimant was not entitled to compensation however as 
causation could not be established.  On appeal, no comment was made on this ground.   
Fitness for purpose and merchantable quality: 
It was clear that Vioxx was successful in acting as a pain reliever for arthritis sufferers. 
However, while Jessup J did agree that Vioxx relieved pain, it also doubled the risk of heart 
attacks and therefore was not fit for either the subjective purpose nor was it of merchantable 
quality.
73
 This ultimately turned to the question of ascertaining what the patient’s purpose 
was. What was notable was that Vioxx was prescription medication and thus any implication 
of the purpose of Vioxx also had to take into account the terms, advice or instructions 
accompanying that prescription from the doctor.
74
 Likewise, any purpose which the 
manufacturer implicitly made known to the consumer had to be qualified by and take into 
account any risks which the medication posed and was known to by medical practitioners or 
the plaintiff’s doctor. This is where Jessup J distinguished Peterson from Carey-Hazell, for 
while the risk of developing a clot was well known in Carey-Hazell, the medical community 
was not aware of the increased risk of heart attack as a result of consuming Vioxx. Counsel 
for Merck then tried to argue that strict liability provisions imposed norms of conduct which 
were inappropriate to the inherent properties of a prescription medicine – namely the inherent 
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risk of side effects.
75
 Liability relied on whether the risk made Vioxx less than reasonably fit 
for purpose, and a blanket assertion that the risk was an unavoidable side effect was no 
excuse.
76
 It was reasonable for a consumer to expect that a medication for the relief of 
arthritic pain would not carry such a risk.
77
 
The Full Court disagreed. Firstly, for reasons which were specific to the facts, Peterson’s 
subjective purpose was not understood to include a negative element – ie: that Vioxx would 
not increase the risk of heart attack.
78
 Secondly, and most importantly the Full Court 
recognised that “almost all medications have side effects.”79 Contrary to Jessup J’s statement, 
it was not reasonable for a consumer to expect that merely because Vioxx was a medication 
intended for human consumption that it was not dangerous to health.
80
 MSDA’s appeal on 
both these sections was upheld. However, the primary reason for why MSDA’s appeal for 
both sections was upheld was because there was lack of causation rather than the substantive 
operation of these two provisions.   
Safety defect and the development risk defence: 
At trial, Jessup J found that “the Vioxx tablets that were ultimately consumed by the 
applicant...had a defect within the meaning of s75AD.”81 The main reason was the failure to 
include any information, advice or warning of the associated risk of heart attacks. A 
consumer, Jessup J wrote, was reasonably entitled to expect that drug suppliers would 
provide such information to medical practitioners to assist in deciding whether that drug 
should be prescribed or consumed.
82
 However, when the discussion turned to whether the 
development risk defence should apply, the defence was allowed on the basis that the unsafe 
nature was not in the instructions but something inherent in Vioxx as a matter of 
composition
83: Vioxx was unsafe “because it increased the risk of myocardial infarction.”84 
As it was Merck’s product, Merck’s own knowledge about the safety of Vioxx was the 
scientific knowledge, and as it was not until September 2004 they were aware of such risk 
and thus able to provide appropriate warnings, the defence was allowed.
85
  
The Full Court agreed, although again they flagged that they would have dismissed the claim 
due to lack of causation. The appeal court agreed with Jessup J’s assessment that both the 
defective nature and the development risk defence applied to the case.  
OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
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Internally inconsistent: the existence of alternative grounds:  
Both the Ryan and Peterson judgments highlight the paradox of having the statutory 
consumer guarantees and claims for safety defects as alternative and concurrent grounds of 
liability. The ability of a defendant to argue a defence and defeat a claim, only for a second 
ground to be revived has been described as remarkable,
86
 as this internal inconsistency acts 
contrary to the policy objective behind both regimes that the law should be consistent and 
promote certainty and business efficiency. Plaintiff consumers are not guaranteed success; yet 
defendant manufacturers are faced with the daunting task of having to answer multiple, 
independent statutory grounds. The attempt by lawmakers to provide varied and alternative 
grounds for consumers to increase chances of a successful claim may have backfired. 
Drugs and strict liability – control and limitations: 
The statutory guarantees operate on strict liability grounds: liability without fault basis 
(although causation still has to be proven). The policy reasons supporting this, as stated 
previously, are well-founded. By doing away with the need to prove fault, the evidentiary 
burden upon the plaintiff is eased as the burden of proof has been done away with.
87
 In 
addition, manufacturers enjoy the advantage of economies of scale when buying insurance.
88
 
Teff summarises the three most commonly cited grounds in favour of products liability 
approach as “deterrence, moral responsibility of the manufacturer and rational risk 
allocation.”89 
But to what extent are the above reasons true in the context of drugs? As described in the 
introduction, drugs are a difficult product with unpredictable qualities and manufacturers are 
limited by science and regulations which other industries often do not face, or encounter to 
such a broad extent. Likewise, pharmaceuticals offer greater social utility to consumers, 
compared to more common household goods. This raises the question about the 
appropriateness of imposing strict liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers. The defendants 
in Peterson recognised this, arguing that the “inherent risks of side effects” in 
pharmaceuticals made it inappropriate to impose strict liability on the respondents.
90
 Doing 
so may translate to increased pharmaceutical costs to the consumer as manufacturers will take 
into account increased testing procedures, potential losses and insurance, so that the 
consumer may be safer in health, but is financially disadvantaged. Even though Australian 
patients do enjoy the support of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), a recent study 
found it can take up to 17 months before new drugs are listed on the PBS.
91
 Effectively, 
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consumers would be deprived of financial support to obtain an essential drug for up to 17 
months, which is quite a substantial period of time. As well as approvals by various 
pharmaceutical committees in determining economic and safety effectiveness of the 
medication, a new review process now includes Cabinet review of proposed 
pharmaceuticals.
92
 Conversely, as some prices of prescription pharmaceuticals are 
controlled,
93
 the manufacturer would then be financially disadvantaged as they are unable to 
pass on these costs to the patients.  
Newman-Martin also points out there are external limitations to the manufacturer’s ability to 
ensure the safety of their drugs – for example: ethics committee approval for trials to 
commence or ethical constraints during the trial process.
94
 Another limitation is the 
communication between a medical practitioner and their patient, including the prescription of 
and usage of the drug in question, which a manufacturer is not privy to. It is contrary to 
policy objectives and to common sense that a manufacturer should take responsibility for an 
irresponsible doctor and both parliament and the courts commonly refer to the significant 
extent patients will rely on their doctor’s medical advice. In the case of design defects, while 
strict liability may be intended to have the effect of encouraging manufacturers to opt for 
safer, alternative designs,
95
 there may not be an alternative for that particular pharmaceutical 
product. Finally, there is the external factor of the human biology, where each drug may react 
differently due to the physiological makeup of each individual patient. It is impossible to ask 
a manufacturer to account for such complexities.  
Teff
96
 questions the effect of deterrence that product liability laws would have on the 
pharmaceutical industry, citing drug regulatory requirements pre-marketing as well as general 
commercial sense: “a company’s degree of care in production methods is largely dictated by 
its wish to survive and create good will.” While the latter is a good point, the strength of drug 
regulatory bodies does need to be reviewed. The existence of a national regulatory body such 
as the US FDA is cited to give consumers peace of mind; however in reality, the ability of 
such bodies to do so is being questioned. Increasing reports of under-funding, lack of 
resources as well as being subject to political pressure,
 97
 give rise to doubts about the proper 
carrying out of their functions and the ability to have the desired deterrent effect.  
Given that one of the policy concerns of lawmakers in the 1980s TPA reforms was ensuring 
that manufacturers were only liable to the extent they controlled their goods, the imposition 
of strict liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers appear unjustifiable in light of the above.  
The importance of technological innovation:  
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Business efficiency, through technological and innovative product development was another 
policy objective. The development risk defence was in direct response to concerns that the 
product liability regime would impact negatively on these considerations. England had 
similarly adopted the defence for offering relief to the business industry. During negotiations 
leading up to the European Directive on Product Liability, the Thatcher government insisted 
that pro-manufacturer initiatives be included in the regime and specifically named the 
development risk defence as one example.
98
 In light of this, it is surprising that Australian 
lawmakers are willing to offer this defence on the one hand as a reprieve, while taking it 
away with the other in the form of strict statutory liability guarantees- as strict liability could 
form an obstacle to innovation and release of new products onto the market.
99
 One wonders 
however, just how serious the impact of excluding the defence would have been – as the 
ALRC initially noted, the absence of such a defence from strict liability provisions Part V, 
Div 2A did not “seem to have stifled product innovation or made insurance less available.”100 
As for the defence, significant literature has been dedicated to discussing its pros and cons.
101
 
In addition to the innovation and development argument, other reasons for supporting the 
defence have ranged from compelling manufacturers to carry out careful research and to 
periodically test the product,
102
 to invest in these mechanisms,
103
 and also in the name of 
fairness.
104
 If liability is imposed due to an imbalance of information, the defence recognises 
that where there is no imbalance of information as the manufacturer was also unaware of a 
defect, there should not be liability.
105
  
Arguments against the defence have focused on concerns about safety – that the industry, 
knowing they enjoy a defence, may no longer deem it necessary to conduct broader 
research
106
 and that from the point of view of policy objectives the inclusion of this defence 
derogates the product liability regime’s otherwise strict liability nature.107 In addition, the 
procedural and scientific niceties in establishing this defence have been raised:
108
 what 
evidence is “relevant scientific evidence?” Scientific and technical knowledge are not clear-
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cut or immediate, but rather, occur gradually and in a piecemeal fashion.
109
 At what stage 
does “suspicion” of the existence of an adverse reaction become scientific “knowledge” in 
order to satisfy the defence’s threshold?110  
Pharmaceuticals and false representations:  
With s137C of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 not allowing claims for damages 
under s18 ACL, s29 on false and misleading representations becomes a focus, especially its 
expansion to include prohibiting false and misleading testimonials.
111
 In the 2011 case 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission vs Allergy Path Way Pty Ltd and Keir 
[2011] FCA 74, a company producing allergy medication was held liable for the publication 
of testimonials made on its social media pages by third parties. While the issues in that case 
focused on the concept of publication and contempt of court, the court did comment on the 
positive effects for a company of testimonials and praises for its services. Such an 
amendment is warranted and consistent with the consumer protection objective in the 
pharmaceutical context. 
The types of and the test for “defect”:  
In the Explanatory Memorandum to Part VA, Attorney-General Michael Duffy expressly 
listed the three types of potential safety defects: design, manufacturing and instruction. 
Design defects were described as those relating to matters such as composition or structure 
and a finding of liability would affect all products of that design.
112
 Manufacturing defects 
looked at the “process of construction and assembly”113 where the manufacturer failed to 
comply with specifications so that the final product would deviate from the norm.
114
  
Examples of instructional (or warning) defects were “incorrect or inadequate warnings or 
instructions.”115 The definition of safety defect encompassed all three categories.116 
Unlike design defects, Griffith points out that the statistical frequency of manufacturing 
defects can be anticipated and calculated accurately, allowing the producer to incorporate 
these figures into their insurance and price of goods.
117
  Design defects on the other hand, are 
relatively unpredictable, with pharmaceuticals being the worst offenders
118
: Thalidomide and 
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Diethylstilbestrol (DES), two of the most significant drug disasters in history, were both 
associated with design defects.   
Yet, Australian legislation makes no reference to these three types and this omission appears 
to have been continued in some of the case law. For example, in Peterson, it was agreed 
Vioxx was defective but not in the nature of manufacture. Rather the judgments appeared to 
alternate between instructional and design defect, without ever expressly labelling what type 
it was. Initially it appeared to be instructional; however, both judgments tacked onto that talk 
of composition,
119
 and thus referred to design. For example, the Full Court wrote:
120
 
“...The defect was that in some people by a mechanism not known and 
the subject of no hypothesis it increased the risk of myocardial 
infarction and provided no information, advice or warning to this 
effect.” 
The express classification of the type of defect as well further analysis of the consumer 
expectations test which applies throughout the ACL may hold the key to ensuring that 
liability can be better allocated.  
What can one “reasonably expect” or be “entitled to expect” of pharmaceuticals? 
Being a consumer protection regime, the main focus of the statutory regime was, 
understandably, the wellbeing of the consumer and the wider community. Lawmakers had 
their doubts and concerns as to whether consumers and courts would impose unfair 
expectations for a product,
121
 but were satisfied that statutory qualifications to the definitions 
and judicial reasoning would counter this possibility.
122
  
Sections 9 and 54 of the ACL expressly provided the context and circumstances under which 
the good was sold and their nature. Cases such as Medtel and Carey-Hazell confirm 
lawmaker’s confidence in the judiciary. As Pearson123 notes, in those cases, the court took 
note of what the patients and their doctors knew about the risks of the medical devices. These 
risks were then transformed as “acceptable” and part of consumer expectations due to the 
dissemination of information and knowledge, such that if the consumer did suffer that 
particular risk, they would not be able to claim successfully.
124
 
On the other hand, the idea of a consumer or a person, no matter how reasonable, determining 
the acceptable legal standards for goods as complex as pharmaceuticals does give rise to 
legitimate concerns. The test has been described as the statutory replication of a major 
shortcoming of negligence: being vague, indeterminate and difficult to establish prior to a 
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court hearing.
125
 It has also been criticised for failing to balance the risk the product poses 
against the social utility it offers.
126
 Griffiths acknowledges the rationale of consumer 
protection and although the test might make sense in manufacturing defects, how would a 
consumer know about safety in design?
127
  
Given the difficulty design defects pose for product liability law, it may be that Australian 
lawmakers purposely declined to address this issue.
128
 This is especially so in the 
pharmaceutical context. The idea of a consumer determining drug design standards is absurd, 
especially when even manufacturers themselves are unable to reasonably foresee all side 
effects of their creations, due to the unique interaction with each individual patient’s biology. 
Some side effects in pharmaceuticals are unavoidable (as the Full Court in Merck made clear) 
but their social utility is undeniable. Throughout the evidence in Peterson, there was never an 
allegation that Vioxx failed in its purpose as a pain reliever. In fact, upon release, it was 
applauded by specialists who welcomed it as an alternative to older pain relievers which 
caused stomach ulcers (which in turn caused approximately 20 000 deaths annually in 
America).
129
 Yet, but for the appeal judgment, MSDA would have found themselves strictly 
liable merely because the reasonable consumer would not expect side effects. The Peterson 
judgments put the spotlight on the importance of distinguishing the types of defect and the 
appropriateness of a blanket consumer expectations test, especially where the good in 
question offers a significant social benefit. 
Are pharmaceuticals a unique type of good?  
Finally, three characteristics associated with pharmaceuticals set them apart from common 
consumer products, further questioning the application of a consumer product liability 
regime.  
Ordinarily acquired? 
Section 3(1)(b) of the ACL defines a “consumer” as, among other things, a person who 
acquires particular goods, with the goods being “of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, 
domestic or household use or consumption.” Yet, pharmaceutical drugs are not “ordinarily 
acquired” in the way that common household goods are.130 The former usually requires a 
prescription from a medical practitioner as well as substantial reliance upon the advice of 
intermediaries. The latter usually involves going to the supermarket with a shopping list 
handy. In America, drugs are specifically excluded from the definition of consumer 
products.
131
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The learned intermediary: 
Another aspect which sets pharmaceuticals apart is the learned intermediary and a distinctive 
feature, whereby pharmaceuticals are distributed upon their recommendation.
132
 During 
Peterson, counsel for the respondents twice
133
 raised the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 
submitting that as the supply of prescription medicines is mediated by “the prescribing doctor 
and dispensing pharmacist” it was necessary to take this into account in determining 
manufacturer’s liability. If liability is assigned on the notion of control, the corresponding 
argument would be that liability should only be to the extent of fault or misconduct. The 
development risk defence is one example of this. The learned intermediary doctrine is 
another. It recognizes the special method of distribution of prescription drugs operates to 
limit liability of drug manufacturers for failure to warn consumers directly of the risk.
134
 
However, virtually no Australian literature has studied the benefits and limits of this doctrine 
and its applicability to Australia. With the potential increase in pharmaceutical litigation in 
Australia, it is necessary to examine this issue.   
Medical and scientific uncertainties in causation:  
Despite attempts to streamline the statutory regime and ease legal and evidentiary burdens, a 
tipping point which continues to exist is the element of causation. In the Peterson saga, both 
at trial level and on appeal, causation was the bane of the plaintiff’s claim.135 Both judgments 
repeatedly alluded to the lack of evidence establishing a causal link. A possibility was not 
sufficient – Vioxx had to be a necessary condition for the occurrence of the heart attacks.136 
Epidemiological evidence was seriously diminished
137
 by the existence of other factors, 
which the trial judge had identified – in particular by the patient’s medical history: 
hypertension, obesity and evidence of previously existing coronary difficulties and the fact 
that the patient was a former smoker.
138
  Similar principles were applied to the statutory 
claims on appeal and the appeal was allowed. 
In 1992, before the rise of such claims, the Australian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association submitted to the Senate Committee:
139
   
“proof of causation is often a matter that presents plaintiff’s with 
difficulties...because pharmaceuticals are generally used in the 
treatment of people who are already ill.  It is therefore necessary 
for plaintiff to attempt to distinguish between conditions in the 
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individual that result from the underlying illness and those that 
result from the pharmaceutical.” 
Therefore, aggravating the already existing uncertainties of pharmaceuticals is the additional 
difficulties that causation poses. The existing underlying condition makes it difficult to 
distinguish the “effects of medication from the natural progression of illness.”140 Should a 
manufacturer be held liable where the pharmaceutical product did not cause the injury but did 
materially increase the risk of injury, and this increase in conjunction with the patient’s 
existing condition then resulted in the injury?
141
 It is not enough that the plaintiff prove the 
pharmaceutical is generally responsible for that injury, but that it caused their particular 
injury.
142
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
In addition, even if counsel were able to obtain evidence to establish causation, a judge and 
lay jury may have difficulty comprehending the evidence.
143
 Scientists demonstrably have “a 
totally different approach from the lawyers to such philosophical concepts as causation and 
proof,” yet their evidence is then to be applied and used in a court of law 144 . So 
understandably there is a disjunction between the theory of science and the theory of law. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
This article aims to highlight the objectives that were considered by Australian lawmakers 
and how they were embodied in the respective product liability regimes. An analysis of 
Australian case law demonstrates problems with the operation of the current regime and its 
unsuitability for pharmaceutical products. This analysis also reveals the potential for law 
reform using a comparative law approach. The safety defect provisions were influenced by 
European developments while a significant part of the ACL was derived from New Zealand 
statutory law. Future research will look at recommending reforms to the Australian statutory 
regime, as informed by a comparative law analysis to insure policy objectives are satisfied. 
Finally, while aspects of the Peterson judgment have been questioned in this article, the 
author acknowledges that Jessup J was limited by precedent and a problematic statutory 
regime. His Honour must be commended for applying these to a complex mix of factual and 
scientific circumstances to determine an equally complex set of legal issues.  
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